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The Questfor FullEmployment and
Economic Stability; 1960-1966
SINCE THE END of World War II, full employ-
ment, rising productivity, and a stable price level have been
major objectives of economic policy in the United States, as
they have in every other industrial country. All segments of our
society—businessmen and labor leaders, farmers and urban
workers, educators and legislators—now accept and endorse
these objectives, particularly the need for full employment.
Each year the President's Economic Report reaffirms alle-
giance to the principles of the Employment Act of 1946. Each
year the Joint Economic Committee appraises the President's
program for promoting "maximum employment, production,
and purchasing power," and prods both the Congress and the
executive to pursue whatever measures seem needed to
achieve or maintain full employment and economic stability.
Each year scores of governmental, business, labor, and civic
groups, besides many hundreds of individual economists and
other intellectuals, join in the continuing debate on the most
appropriate means of achieving the broad economic objectives
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on which Americans are so generally agreed. The present
meeting is one of many such efforts to seek better ways of
moving toward our national objectives.
The constant attention that we give to public economic poli-
cies is proof enough, if any were needed, that the economy
rarely performs as well as we think it should. True, we have
made considerable progress toward full employment and eco-
nomic stability in our generation, and we have accomplished
this while preserving the essentials of political and economic
freedom. Financial crises, which frequently disrupted eco-
nomic life in earlier times, no longer exacerbate our troubles.
Expansions of aggregate economic activity have tended to be-
come longer. Contractions have become both shorter and
milder, and the business cycle has lost much of the terror that
it held for our fathers. Not only that, but the trend of output
per man-hour, which is the most vital source of improvement
in the general welfare, has moved upward faster than in earlier
decades of this century. These gains are impressive when
viewed against the background of past experience. However,
the yardsticks that we apply to the performance of the econ-
omy have also tended to become more exacting, and in any
event we have not escaped our share of disappointments.
While the level of both employment and production has been
generally high and rising during the past twenty years, we
have experienced some troublesome recessions. Even in years
of extremely brisk activity, such as 1956 and 1966, large groups
of people—notably Negroes and teenagers—have continued to
be subject to a higher risk of unemployment than the working
population at large. And even those workers who have had
the good fortune to hold down steady jobs at rising wages256TheBusiness Cyclein a ChangingWorld
have found that theft improved money earnings, and also their
accumulated savings, are partly illusory on account of the up-
ward tendency of prices.
Economic instability has not yet vanished in our country,
any more than it has vanished in any other country that values
freedom sufficiently to practice free enterprise on a major
scale. Nor, for that matter, has it vanished in the Socialist
world where economic life is largely organized on the basis of
state edicts. For example, Czechoslovakia experienced a reces-
sion in 1963, Communist China suffered a great depression af-
ter 1959, Yugoslavia has found it prudent to encourage many
of her workers to look for jobs in Western Europe, the Soviet
Union has suffered substantial unemployment of the seasonal
and frictional type, and Poland has struggled for years with
the burden of inefficiency resulting from the practice of requir-
ing its industrial enterprises to absorb more workers than they
need. And just as it is impossible to find, whether we look West
or East, any final solution to the problem of unemployment, so
also it is difficult to find substantial stability of the price level
anywhere. Indeed, the advance of the price level of our total
output, although it has reduced the purchasing power of the
dollar by about 40 per cent during the past twenty years, still
ranks as one of the better records of the postwar period.
These imperfections of economic achievement, both in our
own past and in other parts of the world, need to be recalled at
a time when the course of our economy has again become
sluggish. Only two years ago we boasted that the economic ex-
pansion which started early in 1961 had already proved more
durable than any of its predecessors under peacetime condi-
lions. Now, despite a tremendous upsurge of federal expendi-
ture, which is bound to continue for some time on account of
the war in Vietnam, many economists are concerned that ourFull Employment and Economic Stability257
nationmay once again be on the brink of recession. Only a
short time ago the view was spreading in business and govern-
mental circles that monetary and fiscal policies would hence-
forth adjust the aggregate demand for goods and services so
closely to what the economy can produce at full employment
that the danger of recession need no longer be taken seriously.
Now, many economists are questioning the skill of governinen-
tal policymakers and some are even suggesting that govern-
mental policies have a chronic tendency to destabilize the
economy. Any such sweeping generalization can hardly be
justified. Nevertheless, in view of recent shifts of fortune and
opinion, it may be useful to stop and consider some of the
difficulties in the management of prosperity; in particular, how
public policy drove the economy forward after 1960, why
rapid expansion has temporarily given way to sluggishness,
and what guidance can be derived from these experiences for
the future. That is my purpose in this evening's lecture.
H
Themain source of our national prosperity has always been
the hopefulness, initiative, skill, and energy of the American
people. By and large, we have also been blessed with good
government and with public policies that have left large scope
for the expression of these qualifies. The increasing attention
of government to the problem of full employment and eco-
nomic stability has led in our generation to ever-changing
permutations of policy and they too have left their mark on the
character and rate of economic progress. This has been singu-
larly true of the years since 1960 which have been character-
ized by much boldness and innovation of governmental policy
in the economic sphere. History, however, does not divide258TheBusiness Cycle in a:. Changing World
itself neatly into stages or periods. What happened after 1960
wasconditioned by developments in the immediately preced-
ing years.
Taken as a whole, the decade of the 1950's experienced sub-
stantial advances in production, employment, and living stan-
dards. The later years of the decade, however, brought difficul-
ties in quick succession. The recession following the Korean
War came to an early end under the impetus of stimulative
govermnental policies. But as so often happens in a modem
economy, the confidence of the business community soon
spilled over into excessive exuberance. During 1956, business
construction and the machinery and equipment industries
forged ahead at an extremely rapid rate, while the output of
the consumer goods trades became sluggish and homebuilding
actually slumped. The average level of prices advanced swiftly
in wholesale markets, but costs of production rose faster still
and profit margins shrank. These and other imbalances gradu-
ally undermined the process of expansion. In July 1957, a re-
cession got under way; and although it proved to be brief, it
was the sharpest decline of aggregate activity in the period
since World War II. The recovery that followed was strong at
the outset, but it soon faltered and it did not return the nation
to full prosperity. In the spring of 1960, when the unemploy-
ment rate was still 5 per cent, the economy again lapsed into
recession. During this decline of activity, total output held up
exceptionally well. But when the labor force and productivity
keep increasing, the mere cessation of growth in physical out-
put suffices to create trouble. Unemployment mounted during
1960 and reached 7 per cent in the spring of 1961.
The unsatisfactory performance of the economy in the late
1950's can be blamed in part on governmental timidity or ex-
cessive concern over inflation. There were, however, good rea-
Sons for concern and caution. The inflation of 1956—57 wasFull Employment and Economic Stability259
freshin people's memories. President Eisenhower and other
high officials realized that the advance of prices would have
been smaller if they had moved as promptly and as energeti.
cally to curb the excesses of the boom as they had previously
moved to check the post-Korean recession, It was only natural
that men in authority were resolved not to repeat the mistake.
But once the recession started in 1957, the government could
not very well remain aloof. Some prominent officials and many
private citizens urged a prompt reduction of personal and cor-
porate income tax rates. They pointed out that the nation was
still functioning with a tax system that had developed under
wartime conditions, and they argued that a lightening of the
tax burden would strengthen incentives, enlarge economic
horizons, and thereby release fresh and enduring forces of ex-
pansion. This compelling plea went unheeded because of fear
of budgetary consequences. Instead, credit conditions were
eased and federal spending was allowed to expand. The deci-
sions to increase spending did not come at once; they came in
a long series, sometimes grudgingly, and thus spread out over
months. But when the successive small accretions were finally
added up in late 1958, it was discovered that they came to a
much larger total than our fiscal authorities had either planned
or advocated—indeed, that they made a larger dent in the
budget than, say, the $5 billion tax cut that was then being
urged would have entailed.
The main impact of the new federal spending programs
came after the economy began recovering. A cash deficit of $13
billion, which still stands as the largest annual deficit since
.1946, piled up in the fiscal year ending in June 1959—a year of
continuous business expansion. This emergence of a huge defi-
cit at a time of rather rapid economic advance was merely the
most dramatic of a series of developments that cast doubt on
the financial policy of the government. Over a long stretch of260The BusinessCycle in a Changing World
history, it had been characteristic of the level of wholesale
pricestofallduring contractionsofaggregateactivity,
thereby erasing all or part of the advance that had occurred
during the expansion phase. In the recession of 1957—58
wholesale prices departed from rule, actually rose, and thus
gave fresh support to the widely held theory that we are living
in an age of inflation. This sombre view about the future was
reinforced by the deterioration in the balance of payments.
During 1958, imports rose sharply, exports fell, and our stocks
of gold were cut by two billion dollars. More ominous still, for-
eign financiers, who hitherto appeared to have unbounded
faith in American finances, began to whisper serious doubts
whether the integrity of the dollar could be counted on in the
future.
Financial developments during 1958 and the fears which
they engendered thus strengthened the determination of gov-
ernmental authorities to try to prevent, now that the economy
was again advancing, the sort of excesses that had led to an in-
flationary boom during 1956—57. Both our international politi-
cal position and the interests of the domestic economy clearly
required better management of prosperity. Having moved too
slowly to restrain the preceding expansion, they were ready to
move with all necessary speed this time. Still embarrassed by
the increase of the discount rate in August 1957, which came
when the boom was akeady turning into recession, the mone-
tary authorities now took steps to restrain the expansion of
credit almost as soon as the first blush of economic recovery
was recognized. Before 1958 ended, free reserves of the com-
mercial banks were akeady wiped out. Pressure on reserves
was sharply intensified during 1959. In consequence, the
money supply began to decline and interest rates moved up
with extraordinary speed. Meanwhile, the budgetary authori-
ties brought the expansion of federal spending to an abruptFull Employment andEconomicStability261
halt.Since tax revenues continued to pile up as economic activ-
ity grew, the budget moved from an enormous deficit in early
1959 to a sizable surplus twelve months later. Taken together,
these fiscal and monetary measures accomplished one of the
most violent shifts on record from a policy of stimulation to a
policy of restraint.
The abrupt shift of policy proved more restrictive than gov-
ernment officials planned or expected. Largely as a result of
their actions, the economic expansion that started in April
1958, came to a premature end and unemployment rose at a
time when it was akeady excessive. These unhappy conse-
quences, however, had their redeeming side. The very abrupt-
ness and magnitude of the policy shift routed an inflationary
psychology, demonstrated that ours need not be an age of in-
flation, forced businessmen to reduce waste and improve
efficiency, created sufficient slack in the labor market to im-
pede substantial wage increases, and thus reestablished stabil-
ity in costs and prices. That these conditions were produced
without causing a collapse in the state of confidence was an
accomplishment of no small significance. The aggregate de-
mand of final buyers, both domestic and foreign, kept growing
throughout the recession of 1960—61. Fortunately, the mone-
tary authorities reduced the discount rate one month after the
recession started in 1960, instead of raising it one month later
as in 1957. The easing of credit helped to maintain aggregate
demand and thereby hastened the end of the inventory adjust-
ment. Fiscal policy, in the meantime, remained stubbornly
quiescent. Governmental authorities were in no mood to toler-
ate larger expenditures, nor would they countenance a tax cut
which was again being urged by capable and disinterested citi-
zens. In February 1961, economic expansion resumed and the
administration's expectation of an early upturn was vindicated;
but before this happened, the nation's electorate decided in a262The Business Cycle in a Changing World
close presidential election to entrust power to the Democratic
party.
HI
In the course of the campaign of 1960, John F. Kennedy prom-
ised that if he were elected president, America would get mov-
ing again. He lost no time in giving a new and bolder twist to
economic policy. Although his administration can hardly be
credited with initiating economic recovery in 1961, it did
assume at once a very active role in nursing the recovery and
in turning what might have been an ordinary expansion into a
remarkable upsurge of the economy. Both political and eco-
nomic circumstances favored an expansionist policy. On the
one hand, the danger of inflation seemed quite remote after
three years of stability in average wholesale prices and in unit
costs of production in manufacturing. On the other hand, the
persistence of slack in industrial capacity and in the labor mar-
ket created a sense of impatience with conservative financial
policies. Something new was expected of the new administra-
tion. The merits of an expansionist fiscal policy—particularly
the advantages of a reduction of income taxes over an increase
of governmental expenditures—had been extensively debated
since 1957, and the nation was in a mood to try some fiscal ex-
periments.
In the first year of his administration, President Kennedy
chose to move cautiously. By and large, he left it to his ad-
visers to popularize the teachings of the "new economics," to
give a scholarly dress to the theory of using fiscal devices to
close the gap between actual and potential output, to create a
vision of an economy that might soon be recession-proof, to
demonstrate that the full-employment surplus (or deficit) is a
better index of the degree of fiscal stimulation than the actualFull Employment and Economic Stability263
deficit,to show that the quest for actual budgetary balance
could be sell-defeating, and to quiet any lurking fears of infla-
tion by suggesting guidelines for the proper behavior of prices
and wages. The President himself was more concerned with
advancing specific policies for which the public was prepared
—such as speeding of procurement and construction in the
interests of recovery, raising agricultural price supports, liber-
alizing social security, lifting the minimum wage, extending
governmental programs for education and introducing health
insurance for the aged. To be sure, the President did recom-
mend an investment tax credit, but he coupled it with tax in-
creases that would prevent any loss of revenue to the Treasury.
He also suggested legislation for stand-by authority under
which the President could temporarily reduce individual in-
come tax rates and accelerate spending on public works; but
he was much too wise about political matters to expect these
measures to win congressional approval in any near future.
President Kennedy's caution was plainly reflected in his Bud-
get Message of January 1962, which called for a smail surplus
in the next fiscal year.
Even at the outset, however, the budgetary practice of the
new administration was less orthodox than the President's rhet-
oric.Plans for federal spending were repeatedly revised
upward during 1961, and actual expenditures followed suit. A
surplus in the cash budget of $3.6 billion in 1960 was followed
by a deficit of $6.8 billion in 196l—the first of an unbroken
series of deficits that is still continuing. Monetary policy also
eased and gave strong support to the liberal expenditure pol-
icy. As expected, consumer spending responded to these stim-
uli and so too did investment in inventories. Business invest-
ment in plant and equipment failed, however, to develop the
vigor that is characteristic of the recovery stage of the business
cycle. By the first quarter of 1962, new orders and contracts for264TheBusiness Cycle in a Changing World
plant and equipment were merely 13 per cent higher than a
year earlier, in contrast to increases of 86 per cent, 43 per cent,
and 31 per cent during the corresponding stage of the three
preceding expansions. Unemployment diminished, but its rate
of decline was abnormally slow. Evidently, the recovery was
not proceeding as well as had been hoped, despite the large
fiscal and monetary stimuli.
The weak link in the chain of economic recovery was busi-
ness investment in fixed capital. In popular discussions, this was
generally attributed to the existence of excess industrial capac-
ity. However, a good deal of idle capacity always develops in
the course of a business slump, and yet this condition has never
been a bar to brisk expansion of investment once confidence
recovers. New firms are then established in larger numbers; ex-
isting firms in turn speed investments associated with innova-
tion; firms that have done well despite the slump enlarge their
capacity in anticipation of stronger markets; while many of the
finns that have fallen behind in the competitive race finally
embark on substantial programs of modernization. If these re-
sponses were not strongly felt in 1961, the reason was a want
of sufficient confidence. Overinvestment in 1956—57, the stead-
ily rising trend of wages, the tendency of profit margins to
shrink during the past dozen years, the sharply reduced rate of
economic growth during the past three or four years—all these
factors contributed to business caution, and so too did the com-
ing of a new administration whose economic policies could not
as yet be fairly assessed. Many businessmen were concerned
that trade unions, which had contributed to the victory of the
Democratic party at the polls, would soon become bolder in
their demands for higher wages and larger fringe benefits.
Some feared that larger governmental spending, however
favorable to markets in the short run, would in due course be
followed by higher taxes. Others feared that direct controls ofFull Employment and Economic Stability265
prices might eventually be undertaken by the government in
order to check the inflationary pressures that would result from
itsfiscaland monetary policies, and still others were concerned
on all these grounds.
The uneasiness of the business community reached a climax
in April 1962, when President Kennedy moved sternly to force
the steel companies to rescind the price increase that they had
just posted. This action by the President had no clear sanction
in law and it caused consternation in business circles. Men rea-
soned that if the government could coerce or punish the steel
industry today, it might move next against the automobile in-
dustry or the aluminum industry or any other. Since the begin-
ning of 1962 economic recovery had shown some signs of hesi-
tation. Now, with confidence shaken and a large inventory
adjustment in the steel industry unavoidable, the continuance
of business expansion became more doubtful. The stock market
reflected the mood of the time by experiencing its sharpest
break of the entire postwar period. Orders for machinery and
equipment were cut back here and there. Private borrowing
stopped rising, raw materials prices softened, profit margins
narrowed, and unemployment stopped declining. The curve of
industrial production, which had risen smartly until April 1962,
flattened out for the rest of the year.
Fortunately, an imminent recession was forestalled. Recog-
nizing that the government's handling of the steel price prob-
lem had disturbed the business community, President Kennedy
turned at once to the difficult task of rebuilding confidence. In
one address after another, he and his lieutenants now stressed
the dependence of our national prosperity on free markets,
higher profits, and larger investment in fixed capital. These re-
assurances were soon followed by measures to reduce the tax
burden borne by the business community. In July 1962, the
Treasury announced that business firms could henceforth266The Business Cycle in a Changing World
reckon their income taxes on the basis of shorter and more
realistic estimates of the life of depreciable facilities. This basic
tax reform was long overdue and it was welcomed by business-
men. With the President's prodding, the Congress enacted
later in the year an investment tax credit which had already
been proposed in 1961, but which was now substantially modi-
fied to make it more acceptable to the business community.
In the late summer of 1962 the President made his boldest
move. His studies of the tax policies of other countries had
convinced him that our tax system was a heavy drag on enter-
prise and investment. In view of the slowdown of the econ-
omy, a "quick" temporary tax cut had its appeal, but the Ways
and Means Committee of the House of Representatives was
more interested in permanent reform and legislation of this
character could not be adopted quickly. In the circumstances,
the President concluded that the time was right to announce
his intention to request the Congress at the beginning of the
next session to adopt a sweeping reform of the income tax, the
main thrust of which would be a massive reduction of tax rates
for corporations and for individuals in every income bracket.
This tax proposal marked a radical departure in economic
policymaking. In 1958 and again in 1960, when the country
was experiencing recession, a tax cut had been repeatedly
urged as a recOvery measure that promised prompt results.
Now, the purpose was to remove the fiscal drag on an expan-
sion which was still under way, to extend thereby the advance
of prosperity, and to risk fiscal deficits for an indefinite period
to realize this objective.
The new tax policies and the new tone of governmental pro-
nouncements had the desired effect on business and investor
sentiment. Fears of hostile governmental intervention in the
day-by-day activities of business finns subsided. Although
many businessmen did not like the budgetary implications of aFull Employment and Economic Stability267
massivetax cut at a time when a deficit was akeady in the
making, they also were quick to see that stimulation of the
economy through tax reduction would serve to strengthen the
private sector of the economy. In any event, the policy of favor-
ing investment was a significant departure from the traditional
policy of the Democratic party, and this fact was not lost on
the business community. With optimism reviving and the state
of inventories in better shape, economic conditions in late 1962
were ripe for a new wave of expansion. By the end of the year,
business commitments for investment in fixed capital began ris-
ing again, and fears of an early recession soon vanished.
In all, about a year and a half elapsed between President
Kennedy's announcement of his plan for tax reduction and its
actual enactment. There were two major reasons for the long
delay. First, the President's fiscal program, as presented to the
Congress early in 1963, called for numerous revisions in the tax
laws as well as a general tax reduction; and while the latter
was welcomed widely, the former evoked powerful opposition.
Second, the President projected an increase of budget expendi-
tures of $4.5 billion for the next fiscal year besides a net tax
reduction of over $10 billion. Many influential citizens who
supported a reduction of taxes were sharply opposed to a
simultaneous increase of expenditure on the ground that such a
fiscal policy would entail a protracted series of deficits. The
fate of the President's program therefore seemed very uncer-
tain for a time. But as the issues surrounding the program were
debated within and outside the halls of Congress, it became
increasingly apparent that the President's main objective was
the tax reduction, and that he would yield ground to his oppo-
nents on other parts of the fiscal package. More and more citi-
zens therefore came to feel that they would not need to wait
much longer for a reduction in taxes. Finally, in March 1964,
when Lyndon Johnson was akeady carrying the burdens of the268The Business Cycle in a Changing World
presidency, the tax cut became law. But months before that,
the growing expectation of its adoption stimulated individuals
and business firms to plan and spend more daringly. The ex-
pansion of economic activity, which was gradually cumulating
of its own momentum, thus moved ahead on a wave of increas-
ing confidence. The gross national product, expressed in real
terms, rose 4 per cent between 1962 and 1963 and well over 5
per cent between 1963 and 1964.
Iv
By early 1964, the expansion of economic activity had already
lasted longer than the average duration of a business-cycle ex-
pansion. Nevertheless, the economy gave every indication that
the advance would continue. Throughout 1964, as production
and employment continued to rise, the structure of economic
activity remained well balanced. A much faster pace in the
output of business capital goods than in the output of con-
sumer goods was only beginning. The ratio of inventories to
sales in major branches of production and trade remained low
or moved still lower. The wholesale price level was substan-
tially steady. Although consumer prices kept rising, the ad-
vance was gentle. Although wages kept increasing, they ad-
vanced at nearly the same rate as the over-all improvement in
productivity, so that unit costs of production remained quite
stable. Profits grew with the volume of business, besides bene-
flUng from revisions in the tax laws—among them, a reduction
of income tax rates which became effective during the year.
Stock prices moved up, but no faster than corporate earnings.
With prices in our wholesale markets steady, while much of
the rest of the world practiced inflation, exports rose sharply
and a larger surplus on merchandise trade piled up than in any
year since 1941. Meanwhile, interest rates remained fairlyFull Employment and Economic Stability269
steady.In view of the still precarious state of the balance of
payments, the monetary authorities sanctioned a moderate rise
of short-term market rates of interest; but the interest rates of
largest significance to businessmen—customer rates on bank
loans, bond yields, and mortgage yields—remained at or below
the level reached at the bottom of the recession in 1961.
Moreover, while federal revenues in 1964 continued to fall
short of expenditures, the deficit now reflected lower tax rates
rather than any further increase of spending. In the debates
that preceded the Revenue Act of 1964, some citizens had
urged larger federal spending as the best way to stimulate the
economy, others argued for tax reduction, and still others felt
that it would be well to travel both roads at the same time.
President Kennedy was favorably inclined to the mixed ap-
proach, but he put much the heavier emphasis on tax reduc-
tion. Even so, the Congress balked. The preamble to the
House bill explicitly assigned top fiscal priority to tax reduc-
tion, with debt reduction next. This meant, as Congressman
Wilbur Mills explained to the House, that the nation was
choosing tax reduction, and rejecting larger spending, as its
"road to a bigger, more progressive economy." In order to
assure adoption of the tax cut, President Kennedy assented to
the preamble and President Johnson did likewise a little later.
Indeed, in his first Budget Message, presented in January 1964,
President Johnson called for smaller expenditures under the
administrative budget in fiscal 1965 than in fiscal 1964. With
this much assured, the Senate promptly passed the House bill
with only minor revisions. And in line with the new fiscal
policy, federal spending actually stopped rising for a lime.
From the third quarter of 1963 to the first quarter of 1965, cash
expenditures remained virtually constant. Thus, private enter-
prise and private demand once again became the great ener-
gizing force of the economy.270The Business Cycle in a Changing World
At the end of 1964, economic activity had already been ad-
vancing for almost four years. The expansion was proving re-
markably durable, but it was not yet exceptionally rapid or in-
tense. This very fact, no less than the deliberate economic
planning of the lime, contributed to the prolongation of the
advance. If the investment in plant and equipment was slug-
gish at the start, this facilitated more vigorous activity later. If
the investment in fixed capital and in inventories was checked
in 1962, that too contributed to greater activity later. If the
shift toward public policies that were more mindful of business
interests took place gradually, that in its turn helped to keep
business optimism within moderate bounds. The expansion
was thus the product of many causes, and not the least among
them was the inheritance of price and cost stability. As late as
1964 there was still a fair amount of slack in the economy, and
this condition continued to exercise a restraining influence on
the market behavior of both businessmen and labor leaders.
The fact, moreover, that productivity improved somewhat
faster after 1960 than in the preceding quinquennium made it
easier for business firms to pay higher wages without incurring
higher costs per unit of output. In the environment of rough
stability of costs and prices that ruled until 1964, there was lit-
tle reason to accumulate inventories as a hedge against in-Ba-
lion. Nor was there any need to rush investments in fixed capi-
tal on the ground that costs were likely to be appreciably
higher next year than now.
Thus, our economy in 1964 had the qualities of order and
balance, besides considerable momentum from within the pri-
vate sector. To be sure, signs were not lacking that the vigor of
expansion was rapidly reducing the slack in productive capac-
ity. Prices of sensitive raw materials had begun rising in spir-
ited fashion as early as the fall of 1963. By the late summer of
1964 a significant increase had already occurred in the numberFull Employment and Economic Stability271
ofbusiness firms reporting slower deliveries of merchandise. In
the closing months of 1964, price increases in wholesale
markets—while usually quite small—had become rather wide-
spread. Toward the end of 1964 the unemployment rate for
married men—who constitute, of course, the more skilled and
experienced part of the labor forcc—had dropped to the level
that ruled during the boom of 1956—57. By the end of the
year, the length of the average workweek in manufacturing
was already at the level reached during the Korean War. How-
ever, in the exhilarating economic and political atmosphere
that ruled in the closing months of 1964, it was easy to over-
look these and other indications of increasing pressure on the
nation's available resources.
V
Clearly, no small part of the economic improvement was due
to the government's tax policy combined with monetary ease.
With the unemployment rate still close to 5 per cent at the be-
ginning of 1965, it seemed only fitting and proper to the man-
agers of our national prosperity to press harder the general
policy of economic stimulation that had proved so dramatically
successful. The second installment of the income tax reduction
for corporations and individuals became effective in January,
but that was deemed insuScient. The President urged in addi-
tion a reduction of excise taxes, and this proposal evoked such
enthusiasm in the Congress that only thirty-four days elapsed
between the introduction of the excise bill and the President's
signature. The new law aimed to reduce excises by $2.2 billion
in the fiscal year beginning July 1965, and by nearly $5 billion
on a full-year basis when all the reductions would take effect.
These tax reductions were not yet the whole of the fiscal stimu-
lus applied in 1965. With the war in Vietnam intensifying and272The BusinessCycle in a Changing World
new civilian programs clamoring for governmental favor, the
fiscal philosophy enunciated in the preamble of the Revenue
Act of 1964 was quickly forgotten. By the last quarter of 1965,
the annual rate of federal cash expenditure was already $12
billion higher than in the first quarter.
These fiscal expedients imparted, of course, a fresh stimulus
to economic expansion. Since the economy was now booming,
governmental revenues rose despite the new tax reductions.
Nevertheless, the deficit increased during 1965, and this need
for finance was reinforced by a tremendous upsurge of borrow-
ing by business firms and consumers. On their part, the mone-
tary authorities made sure that the growing demands for credit
would be met. In fact, they supplied the commercial banks
with reserves so generously that the banks were able to add to
theft investments in securities, besides adding abundantly to
their loans. Indebtedness to commercial banks rose by $25 bil-
lion during 1965, in contrast to $16 billion during 1963 and $18
billion during 1964. Total debt, both public and private, grew
by $96 billion during 1965, in contrast to about $77 billion dur-
ing each of the two preceding years. With credit expanding all
around, the money supply could not stand still. The nation's
stock of money, which had grown at an average annual rate of
less than 3 per cent between mid-1960 and mid-1964, rose at a
rate of over 4 per cent between June 1964, and April 1965, and
at a rate of nearly 6 per cent the rest of 1965. Thus, as the
economy approached full employment, monetary policy be-
came increasingly expansionist. And so, too, did fiscal policy.
The full-employment surplus, which bad become the official
measure of fiscal stimulus, moved irregularly between 1961
Lifid 1963, fell in 1964, and was nearly wiped out by the end of
1965.
The accelerating use of monetary and fiscal stimuli served to
narrow very quickly the remaining gap, as the Council of Eco-Full Employment and Economic Stability273
nomic Advisers reckoned it, between the nation's actual and
potential output. As 1965 drew to a close, the nation could re-
joice that the unemployment rate was finally down to 4 per
cent—the level which the Council had previously adopted as a
reasonable target for full utilization of resources. But the wide-
spread upsurge of public and private spending produced also
other and less welcome results—in wholesale markets, prices
that were 4 per cent higher than in mid-1964; in consumer
markets, prices that were nearly 3 per cent higher; in the labor
market, wages that were beginning to rise at an increasing
rate; and in the money and capital market, interest rates that
were moving up sharply, despite an enormous expansion in the
supply of credit. These evidences of strain on the economy's
resources became stronger during 1966. By the fall of the year,
wholesale prices rose another 2.5 per cent, consumer prices
over 3.5 per cent, while interest rates reached their highest
level in about forty years.
Worse still, the economy became seriously distorted by 1966.
In the first place, as bottlenecks on the supply side became
widespread, the hectic advance of physical production could
not continue. Crosscurrents in the economy therefore multi-
plied and the high expectations of many businessmen were
frustrated. Second, a large gap between the rate of growth of
business investment in fixed capital and the rate of growth of
consumer spending had already lasted three years, and this im-
balance in the structure of production could also not long con-
tinue. Third, concern over possible shortages and slow deliv-
eries caused inventories to rise faster than sales in the early
months of 1966. Later in the year, as the growth of sales weak-
ened, inventories began to pile up involuntarily. Fourth, profits
became vulnerable as a result of the divergent movements of
prices and wages. The advance of wholesale prices abated
after mid-1966, mainly because of weakness in farm and indus-274TheBusiness Cyclein a Changing World
trial materials prices, while the rise of consumer prices quick-
ened. With profits high, the demand for labor strong, and the
consumer price level rising at a disconcerting rate, the upward
push of wages accelerated. Meanwhile, numerous factors
slowed down the advance of productivity—among them, the
poorer quality of newly hired labor, more rapid labor turnover,
lesser diligence of employees, accumulating fatigue of workers
and their managers, slower and less dependable delivery of
materials and equipment, the need to keep much high-cost
equipment in use, and the need here and there to bring obso-
lete equipment back into use. The net result was that the rate
of increase of output per man-hour not only slackened, but fell
below the rate of increase of wages per hour. With demand
pressures, particularly in the consumer sector, beginning to
wane, while unit labor costs were rising all around, a cost-price
squeeze developed in the world of business.
These forces internal to the boom, which were now causing
readjustments in the economy, were heavily influenced, but in
conflicting directions, by governmental policy. Federal cash
expenditures moved up with extraordinary rapidity, and
reached an annual rate of $156 billion in the second half of
1966, in contrast to a rate of $130 billion a year earlier. Tax
revenues also rose rapidly in 1966, largely, but by no means
entirely, as a result of the boom. Higher social security taxes
that had previously been legislated went into effect at the be-
ginning of the year. A little later, some excises were raised and
a speedup of tax payments was ordered. In the fall the invest-
ment tax credit was suspended. Nevertheless, as estimates of
the full-employment surplus indicate, fiscal policy taken as a
whole became even more expansionist in 1966 than in 1965.
But if fiscal policy was still highly stimulative, monetary
policy became severely restrictive. As signs of inflation multi-
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theirpolicy of active credit ease was being carried too far.
They were troubled by the deterioration in the basic condition
of the balance of payments as well as by domestic develop-
ments. As characteristically happens during a boom, imports
were now rising much more swiftly than exports. Besides, the
war in Vietnam was causing large and increasing foreign ex-
change costs. In December 1965, the monetary authorities fi-
nally overcame their hesitation and raised the discount rate,
despite strong opposition from the White House; but they con-
tinued for another few months to allow bank credit to grow at
practically the same rate as before. By the spring of 1966,
when it became apparent that the stimulative thrust of fiscal
policy was not abating, they shifted bluntly to a policy of
credit restriction, thus repeating a familiar pattern. Many busi-
nesses, even large and well established corporations, that
sought to borrow from their commercial banks, now discov-
ered that they would have to get along with less credit or try to
find credit elsewhere. But other financial institutions—life in-
surance companies, mutual savings banks, and particularly the
savings and loan associations—could not extend sigthficant re-
lief, since they were even more hard pressed than the commer-
cial banks. In this constricted environment of finance, not only
did interest rates move up rapidly from a level that was
already abnormally high, but the public market for debt
instruments became disorganized for a while, and total private
borrowing in the final quarter fell to the lowest level for that
season since 1962.
The credit squeeze reinforced the gathering forces of read-
justment in the economy. The homebuilding industry, which is
peculiarly dependent on credit, became the outstanding casu-
alty of financial stringency. Many real estate firms and small
businesses in other lines of activity were injured. Moreover, the
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becamea major negative influence on the stock market as well.
Tight money, however, was not the only factor now disciplin-
ing the boom. With the scope of economic expansion narrow-
ing, labor costs rising, profit margins shrinking, construction
costs running well above investors' estimates, uncertainty
about the course of federal finances growing, and the business
mood gradually becoming less exuberant, powerful forces be-
sides tight money operated to bring the investment boom to a
close. Consumer markets also lost theft vigor as many families
began practicing stricter economies in order to cope with the
rising cost of living. In the meantime, inventories soared and
the need to bring them into closer relation to sales cast a cloud
on the economic outlook for the months immediately ahead.
VI
The recent sluggishness of the economy has inevitably led to
much questioning of governmental policy. In particular, the
monetary authorities have been blamed for bringing on a dam-
aging credit shortage and unacceptably high interest rates last
year. The critics are undoubtedly right if they mean that the
shift from easy to tight money need not have been so blunt.
But the complaint of some goes deeper; namely, that the gov-
ernment should have seen to it that interest rates remained at
the moderate level that ruled until mid-1965. It is doubtful
whether such a result could have been achieved. If the mone-
tary authorities had attempted to peg interest rates, the boom
would have become still more intense and the demand for
credit would have risen still faster. The resulting open infla-
tion, quite apart from other grave consequences, could have
made interest rates rise eventually even more than they did.
After all, when the price level is going up fast and constantly,
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ciation of money during the period of the loan, and no central
bank can force lenders to do anything else. As it was, the ad-
vance of interest rates before April 1966, merely reflected the
fact that the demand for credit had become so intense that it
rose even faster than the extraordinary rise in the supply of
credit. It was only then that the authorities stepped bluntly on
the credit brake.
The fiscal authorities also have not escaped criticism. In
view of the scale of federal spending and the escalation of the
war in Vietnam, they have been repeatedly blamed for not
raising income tax rates early in 1966. It seems likely that if de-
fense costs had not been greatly underestimated, income taxes
would actually have gone up. In that event, monetary policy
would probably have been less restrictive, the homebuilding
industry would have fared better, and some of the gyrations in
financial markets would have been avoided. On the other
hand, since retail trade was already beginning to display some
signs of sluggishness, higher income taxes on individuals might
well have accentuated the slackening rate of expansion. The
case was perhaps stronger for a temporary increase in the cor-
porate income tax or a suspension of the investment tax credit;
but any such measure would also have come at an inconve-
nient time—that is, when profit margins were akeady begin-
ning to recede. As things happened, the suspension of the in-
vestment tax credit did not become law until November, the
very month when the Federal Reserve authorities had already
begun relaxing the credit restraints.
The fact is that prompt or really good solutions are rarely, if
ever, available for the imbalances generated by inflation. Once
forces of inflation have been released, it becomes very difficult
to bring them under control without some sizable readjust-
ments in the economy. Mistakes in economic policy were un-
doubtedly made in 1966 as in every year; but they largely278The Business Cycle in a Changing World
derived from the fateful policies of 1965 when, despite the
larger spending on defense, practically every weapon in the
arsenal of economic stimulation was brought into use—greater
monetary ease, lower income tax rates for individuals, lower
income tax rates for corporations, lower excise taxes, and larger
spending on programs of the Great Society. All this happened
when moderate measures of restraint rather than accelerated
stimuli were needed, so that the expanding economy could re-
tain its balance. And so we finally come to the agonizing ques-
tion: Why did the nation's policymakers, who for years had
succeeded so well in monitoring a business expansion under
difficult conditions, finally unleash the forces of inflation? Why
did men who showed the ability to profit from experience suc-
cumb to one of the oldest weaknesses of governmental prac-
tice?
One reason, I think, is that they were misled by the very
success that for a lime attended their efforts. Economic expan-
sion was continuing, and the level of costs and prices was re-
maining steady. Even the disequilibrium in the balance of pay-
ments no longer seemed so formidable. The export surplus had
then steadily since 1962 and, disagreeable though it would be
to do so, the adverse capital movement could be handled by
special measures—such as the interest equalization tax of 1963
or new guidelines for foreign loans and investments. With pro-
duction, employment, personal incomes, and corporate profits
going up steadily, and the consumer price level rising less
rapidly than in earlier years, the nation's electorate returned
the administration to power with an overwhelming vote of
confidence in November 1964. Economic policies for and dur-
ing 1965 were shaped in this atmosphere of success, to which
the Council of Economic Advisers had made a very notable
contribution. The massive tax cut was its bold conception, and
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was advancing smoothly was a triumph of the "new eco-
nomics."
The central doctrine of this school is that the stage of the
business cycle has little relevance to sound economic policy;
that policy should be growth-oriented instead of cycle-ori-
ented; that the vital matter is whether a gap exists between
actual and potential output; that fiscal deficits and monetary
tools need to be used to promote expansion when a gap exists;
and that the stimuli should be sufficient to close the gap—
provided significant inflationary pressures are not whipped up
in the process. The magnitude of the stimulus to be applied in
any particular case involves, of course, difficult estimating and
forecasting, but the Council's forecasts were apparently im-
proving. Its economic forecast for 1962 was wide of the mark;
it was better for 1963 and it was nearly perfect for 1964. In
judging economic prospects for 1965, the diminished slack in
the economy could not be ignored. But if the margin for ex-
pansionist policies appeared smaller on this account, the guide-
lines for prices and wages could increase it. That, indeed, was
their basic purpose. Originally presented as a contribution to
public discussion, they had by now been shaped into crisp
rules that might lead to censure of violators or worse. With the
price level nearly steady and unemployment still well above 4
per cent, it thus seemed tolerably safe as well as desirable to
resort to fiscal and monetary stimuli on a larger scale than be-
fore. But as later experience demonstrated, neither trade
unions nor business firms will act often or long in a manner
that is contrary to theft economic interests. Once slack in the
economy was significantly reduced, expectations of stable
prices began to fade, inflationary pressures reappeared, and
their initial symptoms were already visible in 1964, as I previ-
ously noted.
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symptoms, for their thinking was focused on bringing down
the rate of unemployment—an objective to which the govern-
ment was rightly committed. An unemployment rate of 4 per
cent, or possibly somewhat less, had always been the objective
of the administrators of the Employment Act. But in 1961 the
figure of 4 per cent became official for the first time, and this
inevitably added to public pressure for its prompt realization.
However, the economic significance of any particular figure of
unemployment does not stay fixed in a dynamic environment.
In recent times, the labor market has changed profoundly as
the numbers working part-lime or intermittently grew relative
to the stable full-time labor force, as voluntary unemployment
became a larger factor in the total, and as job opportunities for
the unskilled declined. These structural changes in the labor
market tended to make it harder to reach an unemployment
rate of 4 per cent merely by stimulating aggregate demand.
But if this was the case, it was desirable by 1965 to shift the
emphasis of economic policy from expanding aggregate de-
mand to the correction of structural maladjustments. The ad-
ministration read the evidence differently, and it did so in part
because of the theoretical apparatus of the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers. Since the Council identified an unemployment
rate of 4 per cent with a condition of practically full employ-
ment, this figure served as a constant in the equation for com-
puting the potential output. The gap between actual and po-
tential output, in turn, was attributed to a deficiency of
aggregate demand; so that, in effect, any unemployment in
excess of 4 per cent called for correction of an alleged demand
shortage. This was a dangerous shortcut in analysis, since the
gap could obviously arise, in whole or in part, from obstacles
on the side of supply or from a failure of the constituent parts
of demand and supply to adjust sufficiently to one another. To
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would have needed comprehensive statistics on job vacancies.
Unfortunately, such statistics did not—and still do not—exist.
Faulty statistics compounded the difficulties of the policy-
makers. When industrial markets tighten, list prices for a time
are apt to remain unchanged, while effective prices are raised
by reducing special concessions or charging a premium. Since
these common departures from list prices are largely ignored
in the official index of wholesale prices, the rise that it regis-
tered in 1964 and 1965 undoubtedly understated the actual
rise. Another statistical deficiency was still more mischievous.
As originally calculated by the Department of Commerce, the
annual rate of increase in the gross national product during
1965 was consistently too low, quarter after quarter, by
amounts varying from about $2 to $5 billion. This cumulation
of errors left its mark on economic thinking by underestimat-
ing the growth that was taking place, and therefore also exag-
gerating whatever gap may have still existed between actual
and potential output.
Thus, the psychology of success, the novel guidelines for
prices and wages, technical economic analysis, and its statisti-
cal accoutrements, all played their role in moving the nation to
a more expansionist economic policy during 1965. But the role
of philosophic views and political factors, which are always
and inevitably present, may well have exceeded everything
else. The main drive for an expansionist policy came from the
executive establishment. The Congress generally acquiesced,
and so too for a while did the Federal Reserve Board which
still had some misgivings about the degree of caution that it
had exercised in the past. Nowadays, the view is widely held in
economic and political circles that a little inflation is tolerable
because it can lead to a reduction of unemployment and some
alleviation of poverty. The longer-run relations of inflation, un-
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prosperity increasing, it seemed only proper to the President
and his advisers to take bolder steps in behalf of the sectors of
the economy that had been left behind by the march of
progress. With income taxes already lowered, it seemed only
just to reduce excises and thus aid both merchant and con-
sumer, whether rich or poor. The growing involvement in Viet-
nam came gradually and it was not expected to be a major
factor financially. As the year advanced, it became evident
even to many of those who supported the guidelines policy
that trade unions and business corporations either would not
or could not discharge adequately the responsibility of holding
back the tide of inflation which the government, in effect, had
asked them to assume. Indeed, by mid-1965, the Federal Re-
serve authorities had already become gravely concerned about
the course of events; but they were reluctant to take immedi-
ate measures that would run counter to the policy of the
executive—the main source of governmental power. Time is
always needed to carry out a significant shift of policy by a far-
flung government of divided powers, particularly when the
move requires restraints on expansion. In this instance, the
difficulty was magnified by the political cost of returning to
orthodox policies for fighting inflation.
Theories have a power that administrators, no matter how
able, cannot fully control. By and large, economic policy dur-
ing 1965 was still governed by the theory that stimulation of
activity was reasonably safe as long as a gap existed between
actual and potential output, no matter how small the gap was
becoming or how rapidly it was being closed. When small in-
flationary signs appeared, they were at first not believed or dis-
missed as trivial. By the time a change in policy was at-
tempted, it had already been pushed into greater stimulation
than was intended. Thus, deliberately expansionist measures
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shiftin policy and how it might best be executed were being
pondered by the managers of our prosperity.
vii:
Thecourse of economic policy in the United States in recent
years, despite some disturbing misadventures, remains impres-
sive. Since 1960 we surely have made progress in moving to-
ward ournationalobjectives. Production and employment rose
substantially,the advance ofprosperity became widely
diffused, full employment was reestablished, and new doors of
economic opportunity were opened up to underprivileged citi-
zens. The government played a vital part in bringing about
these gains by its imaginative, and yet pragmatic, approach to
the nation's problems. When increases of federal spending
failed to produce desired results, it shifted boldly to tax reduc-
tion, and thus made the psychology of confidence its ally in the
quest for economic improvement. When structural maladjust-
ments in the labor market became clearer, it proceeded to
build on the modest beginnings of the Manpower Develop-
ment and Training Act. And when inflation broke loose, it
finally recognized that orthodox financial measures were better
suited to ournation'sgenius than legal props for the badly
bruised wage and price guidelines.
However, this willingness to learn from experience came
much too slowly at times, and in any event recent years have
brought disappointments as well as successes. Certainly, exten-
sive unemployment lasted much too long, the disequilibrium in
the balance of payments escaped correction, the federal gov-
eminent continued to run a deficit even when full employment
was reestablished, the nation experienced another round of in-
Ration and this, together with the large fluctuations in financial
markets, resulted in a redistribution of wealth that injured284TheBusiness Cycle in a Changing Work!
many defenseless citizens. Economic policy cannot escape a
part of the responsibility for these failures, some of which may
yet haunt us in the future.
Thus, governmental policies for dealing with the problem
of full employment and economic stability have moved along a
rocky road in recent years as in the past. Since the 1930's, eco-
nomic policymakers have indeed demonstrated a capacity to
learn from past mistakes. Too often, however, theft memories
have grown dim with the passage of time. Economic generals,
not unlike their military counterparts, sometimes forget which
war they are fighting, nor do they always know which war to
fight. Nevertheless, significant progress has been made and we
must try to extend it.
The needs are many, and so too are the opportunities. We
need to become better aware of the limitations of the art of
economic forecasting even as we try to improve it. We need to
develop comprehensive data on job vacancies, so that it will no
longer be necessary to guess whether or when a deficiency in
aggregate demand exists. We need to improve our measures of
prices and costs, so that inflationary pressures can be recog-
nized more promptly. We need to develop quarterly projec-
lions of federal revenues and expenditures, similar to the infor-
mation now compiled by the government on business sales
expectations and investment intentions, so that the changing
requirements of fiscal policy can be better evaluated than in
the past or at present. We need to learn more about the subtle
forces that shape the state of confidence. We need to develop
policies for dealing with seasonal unemployment—a problem
that we have largely ignored since the 1920's.
We need to learn to act, at a time when the economy is
threatened by inflation, with something of the sense of urgency
that we have so well developed in dealing with the threat of
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nomic policy more promptly, so that they may be gradual in-
stead of abrupt. And most important of all, we need to learn
better than we yet have the basic truth that, while stability of
the general price level will not of itself bring prosperity in the
years ahead, we cannot very well maintain international confi-
dence in the dollar or have sustained prosperity without it.